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Recent Decisions
SEx-The United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania has held that failure to
hire or promote women to positions for which they are otherwise qualified, on the basis of sex, is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, despite any provision of Pennsylvania law regulating hours
of work for women.
CIVIL RIGHTS-JOB DISCRIMINATION BY

Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D.
Pa. 1971).
Plaintiff, Catherine Kober, sued her employer, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, seeking damages and injunctive relief under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The federal district court had jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act. 2 The court found that the
employer in the litigation was a member of the class coming within the
meaning of the Act.8 The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was
discriminated against with respect to her classification of employment
on the basis of sex. She was classified as a Class A Peripheral Machine
Operator, Job Class 11, and applied for an opening as Console Computer Operator, Job Class 12. A male employee with less seniority was
promoted to fill the vacancy. The defendant stated that it could not
have promoted plaintiff without violating the Pennsylvania Women's
Labor Law4 which limits the number of hours which women can work.
Defendant argued that the Pennsylvania law regulating hours of employment for women established a bona fide occupational qualification
exception under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 justifying
the employer's refusal to promote plaintiff. The district court held that
the paramount provisions of the federal statute prevailed by reason
5
of the supremacy clause, over any state statute.
While the court in Kober does not explain its use of the supremacy
clause, the reasons are related to the interpretations of the bona fide
occupational qualification exception by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The bona fide occupational quali1. §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
2.

Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

3.

Id. § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 101 et seq. (1969).
Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 325 F. Supp. 467, 474, (W.D. Pa. 1971).

4.

5.
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fication is an exception to the requirement of Title VII that employers
shall not discriminate against any employee because of the employee's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 6 The exception in Title
VII provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
or employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or

national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise ....

7

The EEOC was created by Congress and charged with administrative
responsibility for Title VII.8 The EEOC possesses elaborate procedural

mechanisms 9 to prevent unlawful employment practices. The commission, therefore, has the responsibility of determining when a bona
fide occupational qualification exists.
In fulfilling its responsibility, the EEOC has the authority to publish
guidelines 0 concerning Title VII. The guidelines covering the bona
fide occupational qualification changed significantly between 1966 and
1969, particularly with respect to the compatibility of state "protective"
statutes and the Act. The alteration was caused by the EEOC's attempt
to reconcile the provisions of Title VII with various state protective
legislative enactments regarding the working conditions of women. In
the 1966 guidelines, the commission established two classifications for
state protective legislation." State legislation which benefited women
6. Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
7. Id. § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
8. Id. § 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
9. Id. § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. When a charge has been filed, the commission gives
the respondent a copy and investigates the charge. If the commission determines that there
is reasonable cause to believe the charge to be true, it notifies the respondent and seeks to
end the unlawful employment practice through informal conferences, conciliation, and
persuasion. If these methods fail, the EEOC notifies the parties, and the injured party
can file a complaint within thirty days in a district court.
10. Id. § 713, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12.
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1966) provides:
The Commission believes that some state laws and regulations with respect to the
employment of women, although originally for valid protective reasons, have ceased
to be relevant to our technology or to the expanding role of the woman worker in
our economy. We shall continue to study the problems posed by these laws and
regulations in particular factual contexts, and to cooperate with other appropriate
agencies in achieving a regulatory system more responsive to the demands of equal
opportunity in employment.
Id. § 1604.1(c) provides:
The Commission does not believe that Congress intended to disturb such laws and
regulations which are intended to, and have the effect of, protecting women against
exploitation and hazard . . . However, in cases where the clear effect of a law in

686

Recent Decisions

by establishing rest periods or minimum wages would not be permitted
2
to be used by an employer to justify a refusal to hire or promote.'
On the other hand, an employer could refuse to hire or promote women
if state legislation prohibited the type of work required, because it
presented a hazard to women by having them lift weights over certain
3
amounts or work more than a specified number of hours each week.'
Thus, the 1966 guidelines upheld the validity of certain types of state
protective legislation.
In 1968, similar guidelines were published.' 4 But in 1969, the commission adopted a different position regarding state protective legislation, stating that many state laws regulate the employment of
women' 5 and that these state laws, being in conflict with Title VII,
cannot be used to defend otherwise unfair labor practices or to provide
the basis for bona fide occupational qualification exceptions to Title
VII.1' In its 1969 guidelines, the EEOC particularly noted that many
of the so-called protective state enactments do not take into account
the individuality of women workers and tend, rather than protecting
17
women, to discriminate against them in the labor market.
Most of the state legislation designed to protect women was passed
during the first part of the twentieth century when labor conditions
current circumstances is not to protect-women but to subject them to discrimination,
the law will not be considered a justification for discrimination.
12. Id. § 1604.1(a)(3)(i).
13. Id. § 1604.1(a)(3)(ii).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1968).
The Commision does not believe that the Congress intended to disturb such laws
and regulations which are intended to, and have the effect of, protecting women
against exploitation and hazard. Accordingly, the Commision will consider limitations
or prohibitions imposed by such state laws or regulations as a basis for application
for a bona fide occupational exception.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b)(1) (1970).
16. Id. § 1604.1(b)(2).
The Commission believes that such state laws and regulations, although originally
promulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have ceased to be relevant to our
technology or to the expanding role of the female worker in our economy. The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual females and tend to discriminate
rather than protect. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that such laws and
regulations conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and will not be
considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as
a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification.
17. For a fuller discussion of state protective legislation and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, see Lamber, Equal Rights for Women: The Need for a National Policy, 46 IND. L.J.
373 (1970); Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DENVER L.J. 344
(1967); Pressman, The Quiet Revolution, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 31 (1970); Rawalt, Litigating Sex
Discrimination Cases, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 44 (1970); Comment, The Mandate of Title VII
oj the Civil Rights Act of 1964: To Treat Women as Individuals, 59 GEO. L.J. 221 (1970).
See also L. KRANOWlTZ WOMEN AND THE LAW (1970).
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were deplorable.' For example, forty-one states have laws establishing
maximum daily or weekly work hours for women, 19 twenty states prohibit or regulate night-time employment of women,2 twelve states
have weight-lifting limits, 2 1 and twenty-six states have limitations on

the types of jobs women may perform.2 2 These laws may be said to
discriminate against women as a group by closing certain occupations
to them. Another group of state protective laws actually discriminates
in favor of women by requiring benefits which men do not necessarily
enjoy. This group of laws include requiring rest areas and extra breaktime for women. The Pennsylvania statute requires, for example, one
seat for every three women employed, wash and dressing rooms, exhaust fans and lunch rooms for certain establishments, and reasonable
efforts to supply drinking water (for which the employer may not levy
a charge).

28

Title VII does not provide that the state protective laws will continue to be valid. In only two sections of the Act are state laws
24
mentioned, in the context of saving state fair employment statutes.
The saving clause in section 2000e-7 specifically makes inoperative
any state law which requires or permits an unfair employment practice.
Although the bill which passed through the congressional hearings in
1964 did not contain a sex provision in Title VII 2 5 the brief House

debate on the sex amendment, added after the bill left the committee,
reveals that those representatives who spoke in behalf of or against the
amendment believed that the amendment would impliedly repeal
these state protective laws. 26 Nevertheless, the legislative history on the
question is too brief to be conclusive, in light of the bona fide occupational qualification in Title VII which was interpreted by the
EEOC for three years to permit some state protective legislation to
exempt certain women workers from the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Act.
One case decided during the 1967 to 1969 period also supports the
18. See Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 353 (1916); Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV.
495 (1908).
19. Buschmann, Sex Discrimination: State Protective Laws v. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 418.
20. Id. at 419.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 101, 103, 105, 107-112 (1969).
24. Title VII, §§ 706 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) to (d), and § 2000e-7 (1964).
25. See 1964 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News, 2355 et seq.
26. Buschmann, supra note 19, at 422.
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early EEOC interpretation of the bona fide occupational qualification
exception. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company,27 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana permitted Colgate
to limit weights to be lifted by women in generic terms because it
would be extremely difficult for the employer to determine individually
those female employees who could lift weights above the state maximum. The court specifically allowed the enforcement under the bona
2
fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII. "
Other cases decided during this period attempted to reconcile state
protective legislation and the bona fide occupational qualification with
the other provisions of Title VII by construing the bona fide occupational qualification narrowly and then making the employer meet
that burden in order to win. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company," protective state legislation was invoked as a
bona fide occupational qualification to prevent promoting a woman.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said that the employer had the
burden of proving that there was a reasonable factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely
and efficiently the duties of the job involved in order to establish the
bona fide occupational qualification exception. 30 The court held that
Bell had not met that burden by saying that the job was too strenuous
for a woman. The use of such stereotyped sexual characterizations were
deemed too vague to meet the employer's burden.3 ' In Cheatwood v.
South Central Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company," the Weeks
test was applied with similar results.
In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company,33 the court anticipated
the 1969 change in the EEOC guidelines by its decision. The plaintiff
had been refused a promotion. Her duties in the new job would have
violated California's weights and hours legislation.34 The court concluded that refusal to assign plaintiff to the position constituted discrimination solely because of sex3" and held the employer's action
27. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), modified 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). The
modification required Colgate to allow each female worker to qualify, regardless of state
laws.
28. 272 F. Supp. at 365.
29. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. Id. at 235.
31. Id. at 235-36.
32. 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
33. 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
34. CAL. LABOR CODES §§ 251-1252 (West 1971).
35. 293 F. Supp. at 1224.
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invalid as against the sex provision of Title VII. 36 Such state legislation
is contrary to the supremacy clause of the Constitution.3 7 Another case,
however, decided in 1968 in the same district, Mengelkoch v. Industrial
Welfare Commission,5 upheld the state weights and hours legislation.
In each case the supremacy clause was in issue because of the constitutional precedents relating to the authority of the states to establish
minimum hours for workers under their police power. In 1908, in
Muller v. Oregon,39 the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute
setting maximum working hours for women. The Mengelkoch decision
followed this precedent. But, the court in Rosenfeld refused to follow
Muller; instead, it held Title VII to control, and overturned the California statutes by using the supremacy clause.
The Rosenfeld decision is very similar to the decision in Kober.
The courts in both instances used the supremancy clause to void state
legislation relating to the number of hours women may work. Rosenfeld was decided before the EEOC 1969 guidelines, and so could not
rely on them to invalidate protective state legislation. Instead, the court
in Rosenfeld stated that to the extent the guidelines were inconsistent
with the court's holding, they were void. 40 The court in Kober had the
1969 guidelines before it, as well as the Rosenfeld decision. Although
in Kober, the court did not explain why it invoked the supremacy
clause, it may be that it simply followed the Rosenfeld holding because
of the factual similarities between the two cases.
Under the supremacy clause, a state law which contravenes a valid
law of the United States is void. 41 A regulation lawfully made by a
federal officer or board under authority granted by Congress becomes
part of the supreme law of the land which under the federal Constitution is superior to state constitutions and laws. 42 Many employers have
found themselves in the position of having to choose between state and
federal laws when confronted with the provisions of Title VII and
state protective legislation. But, a state law is superseded by a federal
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
39. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court held
that state laws establishing maximum hours of work for male bakery workers was not a
valid exercise of the state's police power.
40. 293 F. Supp. at 1224.
41. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) (1824). See 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conflict of Laws
§ 8 (1964).
42. Glover v. Mitchell, 319 Mass. 1, 64 N.E.2d 648 (1946).
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law only to the extent that the two laws are inconsistent. 3 The purpose
of Title VII is to prevent employment discrimination based on false
assumptions about race, sex, religion, or national origin. 4 Those protective state laws which benefit women by providing for safe and healthy
working conditions, minimum wages, and maximum hours do not discriminate against women. Rather, men should be entitled to the same
treatment. As to these state laws, there is no inconsistency with Title
VII. Its purpose could be carried out by extending the application of
the beneficial state legislation to all employees, male and female, so
that employers would not have the opportunity of shutting women out
of jobs because of their reluctance to provide women with the benefits
that state laws accord them. If employers had to provide the same
benefits for all employees, one type of Title VII issue would disappear.
Other state laws, however, are used by employers to keep female
employees in lower-paying and menial jobs. Laws prohibiting women
from particular occupations, and those which set weight-lifting restrictions are illustrative. These restrictions are unrealistic when the comparable non-work activities of women are considered. Since this type of
law would never be applied to men (for example, men being prohibited
from carrying more than fifteen pounds), women should not have to
comply with these laws either, but should be permitted, as men are, to
decide what their physical and social well-being will tolerate. Substituting free choice for protectionism would give women the equality envisioned by Title VII without forcing upon them the hardships of
enforced "equality."
Under this scheme, the EEOC guideline which rejects discriminatory
state legislation as a bona fide occupational qualification exception to
an otherwise unlawful employment practice could stand, but the bona
fide occupational qualification exception could be applied to those few
instances where sex is a reasonable necessity to the particular business.
For example, actors and actresses, male and female washroom attendants, male and female fashion models, and similar jobs would be the
exception to the rule. In this way, the use of the supremacy clause
could be avoided when attempting to resolve the minimal inconsistencies
between state legislation and Title VII. Since the purposes of state
protective legislation and Title VII are compatible, the inconsistency
43. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
44. See Oldham, supra note 17.
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necessary to invoke the supremacy clause will rarely exist. Alternative
methods which have been suggested for correcting discrimination because of sex, especially use of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or the proposed amendment to the Constitution,
could give women the equality under the law, Title VII's goal, without
forcing courts to make use of questionable statutory constructions.
Following this reasoning, the Kober case would have been decided
similarly but by a different rationale. If the court had explained the
importance of determining the beneficial or discriminatory character
of the state law in each case in order to determine whether the bona
fide occupational qualification would be applicable, then Kober could
have provided the direction needed to unravel the sex provisions of
Title VII.
Karen Jacqueline Bernat

10(b) AND RULE 10(b)-(5) OF THE SECURITIES ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934-The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that a prima facie case has not been presented under section 10(b) and
rule 10(b)-(5) when an apparent fraudulent scheme did not collectively
infect two separate transactions, nor affect the securities exchange market and/or the investing public.
CORPORATIONS-SECTION

Drachman v. Harvey, No. 35077 (2d Cir., July 21, 1971).
Plaintiffs brought a derivative cause of action under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule 10(b)-(5). 2 On behalf of
1. 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act]:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971):
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mail or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
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